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Handbook of Legal Reasoning and Argumentation
Giorgio Bongiovanni, Gerald Postema, Antonino Rotolo, Giovanni Sartor, Chiara Valentini, Douglas Wal
Verlag Springer-Verlag, 2018
ISBN 9789048194520 , 773 Seiten
Format PDF, OL
Kopierschutz Wasserzeichen
Contents
5
Contributors
7
Introduction
9
Basic Concepts for Legal Reasoning
24
Reasons (and Reasons in Philosophy of Law)
25
1 Premise
25
2 The Different Classes of Reasons: Normative, Motivating, Explanatory
26
2.1 Normative Reasons
28
2.2 Motivating Reasons
33
2.3 Explanatory Reasons
35
3 The Ontology of Reasons
37
4 Epistemic and Practical Reasons
41
5 The Modality (and Strength) of Reasons
43
5.1 Conflict and Weighing Between First-Order Reasons
44
5.2 First-Order Reasons and Second-Order (Exclusionary) Reasons
47
6 Reasons in (Philosophy of) Law
49
7 Concluding Remarks
53
References
53
Reasons in Moral Philosophy
56
1 What Is a Moral Reason?
56
2 Explanatory and Normative Reasons
57
3 The Issue of Agential Authority
58
4 Subjective and Objective Reasons
59
5 Personal and Impersonal Reasons: Integrity and Authenticity
60
6 Drawing the Boundaries of the Moral Domain
61
7 Moral Reasons and Moral Reasoning
62
8 Moral Reasons in Conflict
63
9 Moral Reasons and Coordination
64
10 Moral Reasons and Compliance
65
References
66
Legal Reasoning and Argumentation
68
1 Forms of Reasoning by Applying Rules to Cases
69
2 Case-Based Reasoning from Analogy
74
3 Reasoning and Argument
78
4 Reasoning by Drawing Inferences from Sources
82
5 Defeasible Logic
87
6 Reasoning, Argument, and Proof
89
7 Conclusions
94
References
94
Norms in Action: A Logical Perspective
97
1 Introduction
97
2 A Logic for Reasoning About Choices, Actions, and Time
102
3 Formalization of Responsibility and Influence
108
3.1 Responsibility
108
3.2 Influence
109
3.3 The Relationship Between Influence and Responsibility
112
4 Deontic Extension
113
5 Conclusion
118
References
119
Of Norms
122
1 Terminology and Overview
122
2 Normativity
123
2.1 Ought-to-Be and Ought-to-Do
123
2.2 Influencing and Guiding Behavior
124
2.3 Guidance by Norms: The Second-Person Point of View
126
2.4 Norms and Facts
127
3 Rules as Soft Constraints on Possible Worlds
127
3.1 Directions of Fit
128
3.2 Possible Worlds
130
3.3 Constraints
131
3.4 Rules as Soft Constraints
133
4 Kinds of Facts
134
4.1 Objective Facts
134
4.2 Brute Social Facts
135
4.3 Social Rules
136
4.4 Rule-Based Facts
137
4.5 Creation and Derogation
138
4.6 Factual and Descriptive Counterparts of Rules
139
4.7 Norm-Propositions
140
4.8 “Entailed” Norms
141
5 Deontic Facts
142
5.1 Deontic Facts and Motivation
142
5.2 Duties and Obligations
144
5.3 Being Obligated and Owing to Do Something
145
5.4 Permissions
146
5.5 The Anatomy of Ought-to-Do
148
6 Of Norms and Other Rules
150
6.1 Rules as Individuals in the Logical Sense
150
6.2 Dynamic Rules
151
6.3 Fact-to-Fact Rules
152
6.4 Counts-as Rules
152
6.5 Norms
153
6.6 Competence-, Power-, and Other Status-Conferring Rules
154
7 Summary
155
References
156
Values
158
1 Euthyphro Dilemma and Other Questions About Value
158
2 Aims and Desiderata for a Theory of Value
164
3 Some Substantive Questions About Value
166
4 Theories of Value
168
5 Value Disagreement
170
6 Pluralism and Incommensurability
173
7 Values and Rational Choice
178
8 Persons and Values
181
9 Values and Emotions
182
10 Valuing
184
References
186
The Goals of Norms
191
1 Goals–Norms: A Multiple Relation
193
2 Teleologies of Mind: Goals, Functions, and Pseudogoals
194
2.1 What Are Goals?
194
2.2 The Relations Between Psychological Goals and Behavior Functions
195
2.3 Goals Versus Pseudogoals
197
2.4 Subjective Kinds of Goals
198
3 Features of the Goal of an N
201
3.1 Impersonal
201
3.2 Avoidance
201
3.3 Meta-goals
202
3.4 Origin and Base of Norms: Norms Come from the Social Goals to Be Adopted
203
4 The Relationship Between the Mental and External Goals of Ns
204
4.1 Norm Functions and Goals
204
4.2 Subgoals
206
4.3 The Subject and N’s Aim
206
5 Concluding Remarks
207
References
208
Authority
209
1 Two Kinds of Authority: Epistemic and Practical
209
2 Power, de Facto Authority, and Legitimate Authority
210
3 Practical Authority as Personal
211
4 Practical Authority and Its Reason-Giving Capacity
215
5 Practical Authority and Its Capacity to Bind Subjects
217
6 The Kind of Reasons to Which Legitimate Directives Give Rise
219
7 The Justification of Practical Authority
227
References
234
The Authority of Law
236
1 Human Action and Authority: Tracing the Correct Relationship
238
2 Intentional Action Under the Guise of the Good
241
2.1 Aristotle’s Distinction Between Actuality and Potentiality
248
3 Law and Energeia: How Do Citizens Comply with Legal Rules?
251
References
256
Kinds of Reasoning and the Law
258
Deductive and Deontic Reasoning
259
1 Introduction
259
2 Deductive Reasoning
260
2.1 Deductive Reasoning—Logical Consequence as Deducibility
261
2.2 Deductive Reasoning—Logical Consequence as Entailment
266
3 Deontic Reasoning
267
3.1 Introduction
267
3.2 Obligations and Permissions: Basics
268
3.3 Facultativeness
269
3.4 Deontic Logic: Axiomatics and Semantics
272
3.5 Directed Obligations
277
4 Deontic Reasoning—Some Glimpses Beyond
280
4.1 Normative Systems
280
4.2 Normative Dynamics
285
References
287
Inductive, Abductive and Probabilistic Reasoning
291
1 Introduction
291
2 Tales of Woe and Reasoning
296
2.1 Putting Induction and Abduction into Context
298
2.2 Induction and Abduction in Law
305
3 A Primer in Probability Theory in Law
310
3.1 Probabilistic Conceptions of Evidential Value
312
3.2 The Language of Probability
315
4 Conclusion
325
References
326
Defeasibility in Law
330
1 The Idea of Defeasibility
330
2 Defeasibility in Reasoning and Nonmonotonic Inference
331
3 Conclusive and Defeasible Arguments
333
4 Linked Arguments and Convergent Argument Structures
335
5 Attacks Against Arguments: Rebutting and Undercutting
338
6 Rebutting and Undercutting in the Legal Domain
340
7 Levels of Abstraction of Arguments
343
8 Reinstatement
344
9 Dynamic Priorities
348
10 Patterns of Defeasible Reasoning
350
11 Legal Systems as Argumentation Bases
353
12 The Rationale for Defeasibility
356
13 Defeasible Reasoning and Probability
357
14 Defeasibility in the Law
359
15 Overcoming Legal Defeasibility?
361
16 The Emergence of the Idea of Defeasibility in Law and Ethics
364
17 The Idea of Defeasibility in Logic and AI
367
18 Defeasibility in Research on AI and Law
368
19 Defeasibility in Legal Theory
369
20 Conclusion
374
References
375
Analogical Arguments
380
1 The Many Faces of Analogy
380
2 The Architecture of Analogical Arguments
383
3 The Problem Situation
385
4 Prima Facie Similarity
387
5 Relevant Similarity
391
5.1 Relevant Similarity in Legal Analogical Arguments
391
5.2 Theory-Based Analogy
393
5.3 Factor-Based Analogy
396
6 Solution
398
References
399
Choosing Ends and Choosing Means: Teleological Reasoning in Law
401
1 Introduction
401
2 The Structure of Consequentialist Reasoning
403
2.1 The Structure of Evaluation
404
2.2 Rational Choice
405
2.3 Concluding Comments
414
3 Teleology and Instrumentalism
415
4 Choosing Ends
417
4.1 The Legislative Determination of Legal Ends
418
4.2 Interpretation and the Determination of Legal Ends
419
5 Choosing Means
420
5.1 Identifying Options
421
5.2 Choosing the Best Option
422
6 Concluding Remarks
424
References
425
Interactive Decision-Making and Morality
427
1 Introduction
427
2 Basic Information About Game Theory
428
2.1 Tasks and Branches of Game Theory
428
2.2 The Concept of a Game
428
2.3 The Assumptions of Classical Game Theory
429
2.4 Solution Concepts of Noncooperative Game Theory
430
2.5 Evolutionary Game Theory
432
3 Game Theory as a Tool for Better Understanding a Function of Morality
435
4 Game Theory as a Tool for Determining the Content of Moral Norms
439
5 Game Theory as a Tool for Criticizing Certain Moral Conceptions
440
6 Game Theory as a Tool for Analyzing the Problem of the Validity of Moral Norms
441
7 Game Theory as a Tool for Analyzing the Possibility of Deriving Morality from Instrumental Rationality
442
8 Game Theory as a Tool for Analyzing Moral Decision-Making
448
9 Game Theory as a Tool for Analyzing the Nature of Moral Dispositions
450
10 Game Theory as a Tool for Analyzing the Functions of Moral Emotions
453
11 Game Theory as a Tool for Analyzing the Cultural Evolution of Moral Norms
454
12 Conclusions
456
References
457
Special Kinds of Legal Reasoning
459
Evidential Reasoning
460
1 Setting the Stage
461
1.1 Eyewitness Testimony
461
1.2 DNA Evidence
462
1.3 Central Questions
463
2 Three Normative Frameworks
464
2.1 Arguments
464
2.2 Probabilities
465
2.3 Scenarios
466
3 Conflicting Evidence
467
3.1 Arguments
467
3.2 Scenarios
469
3.3 Probabilities
471
4 Evidential Value
473
4.1 Probability
473
4.2 Arguments
475
4.3 Scenarios
477
5 Coherently Interpreting the Evidence
479
5.1 Scenarios
479
5.2 Arguments
481
5.3 Probability
484
6 Reasoning and Decision Making
490
6.1 Probability
491
6.2 Arguments
492
6.3 Scenarios
493
7 Summary and Conclusion
495
7.1 Conflicting Evidence
495
7.2 Evidential Value
495
7.3 Coherently Interpreting the Evidence
496
7.4 Reasoning and Decision Making
496
8 Further Readings
496
8.1 Setting the Stage
497
8.2 Three Normative Frameworks
497
8.3 Conflicting Evidence
498
8.4 Evidential Value
498
8.5 Coherently Interpreting the Evidence
499
8.6 Reasoning and Decision Making
499
References
500
Interpretive Arguments and the Application of the Law
507
1 The Charm of Interpretation
507
2 General Scepticism About Legal Rules
511
3 The Communication Theory of Law
512
3.1 The Communication Theory of Legal Interpretation
514
4 Challenges to the Communication Theory
520
4.1 An Alternative Route for the Contribution Objection
522
5 Complex CT
524
6 Conclusion
526
References
527
Statutory Interpretation as Argumentation
530
1 Introduction
530
2 Interpretive Arguments
532
2.1 The Existing Types of Interpretive Arguments
532
2.2 Classifying Interpretive Arguments
535
3 Translating Interpretive Arguments into Schemes
537
3.1 Assumptions and Common Template
537
3.2 Positive Interpretive Schemes
538
3.3 Negative Interpretive Schemes
540
4 Attacking, Questioning, and Defending Interpretive Arguments
543
5 The Education Grants Example
546
6 Fitting Interpretive Schemes to Cases
552
7 Formalizing Interpretive Arguments—General Structure
558
8 Interpretive Arguments—A Formalization
562
9 Preference Arguments over Interpretive Arguments
564
10 From Best Interpretations to Individual Claims
565
11 Conclusions
568
References
569
Varieties of Vagueness in the Law
572
1 Varieties of Vagueness
572
2 Vagueness in the Legal Context
578
2.1 Ordinary Vagueness
579
2.2 Transparent Vagueness
582
2.3 Extravagant Vagueness
585
2.4 Ambiguity and Polysemy
587
2.5 Conversational Vagueness
589
References
591
Balancing, Proportionality and Constitutional Rights
592
1 Introduction
592
2 Rights, Balancing, Proportionality
593
3 Theories of the Connection Between Rights and Proportionality
594
3.1 Interest Theory and Balancing
594
3.2 Rights as Principles: Robert Alexy’s Theory
596
3.3 Rights and Limitations: Barak’s Analysis
598
3.4 Kai Möller: The Global Model of Constitutional Rights
599
4 Proportionality and Rights: The Critical Theses
601
4.1 Proportionality as a Teleological Approach: Rights as Fungible Goods
602
4.2 Proportionality and “Positive” and “Horizontal” Rights
604
5 Proportionality and Rights Adjudication
605
6 Proportionalism in Review
607
6.1 Proportionality Balancing and Means-Ends Proportionality
608
6.2 Proportionality Between Ad Hoc and Definitional Balancing
613
7 Proportionalism of Review
615
8 Alternative Approaches
618
References
620
A Quantitative Approach to Proportionality
624
1 Introduction
624
2 Quantitative Reasoning Without (Symbolically Expressed) Numbers
625
3 Basic Concepts
628
4 Impacts on Single Values
631
5 Pareto-Superiority
633
6 Comparative Evaluations Without Pareto-Superiority
634
7 Assessing Compliance with Value Norms
638
8 Teleological Reasoning and the Choice of Rules
642
9 Consistency in Balancing
644
10 Conclusions
645
References
646
Coherence and Systematization in Law
648
1 Introduction
648
2 Theories of Normative Coherence
649
2.1 Principle-Based Theories
650
2.2 Case-Based Theories
651
2.3 Constraint-Satisfaction Theories
651
3 Objections to Legal Coherentism
652
3.1 The Vagueness Problem
652
3.2 What Is Coherence-Driven Inference?
653
3.3 The Circularity Objection
655
3.4 Coherence Versus Authority
656
3.5 Coherence and Legal Conservatism
657
3.6 The Alternative Coherent Systems Objection
659
3.7 The Problems of Holistic Coherentism
661
3.8 Value Pluralism, Conflict, and Coherence
662
3.9 Coherence and Truth in Law
663
4 The Coherence Bias: A Plea for Responsibilist Coherentism
666
5 The Value of Coherence
670
5.1 The Argument from Antifoundationalism
671
5.2 Coherence and Emotion
671
5.3 The Argument from Psychological Plausibility
672
5.4 The Argument from the Dynamics of Justification
672
5.5 The Epistemic Value of Coherence
673
5.6 The Practical Value of Coherence
673
5.7 The Argument from the Social Function of Coherence
674
5.8 The Argument from Conflict Resolution
675
5.9 The Constitutive Value of Coherence
676
6 Conclusions
676
References
678
Precedent and Legal Analogy
684
1 Introduction
684
2 Reasoning from Precedent
687
2.1 Nature of Precedential Constraint
687
2.2 How Much Precedential Constraint Is Enough?
689
2.3 Precedential Constraint and Characterization
689
3 Argument from Legal Analogy
691
4 Arguments from Hypotheticals, a Kind of Legal Analogy
694
5 Roles of Differences, Similarities, and Rules in Precedent and Legal Analogy
695
6 Arguments in Practice for Following Precedent or Legal Analogy
700
6.1 Arguments for Following/Departing from Precedent
701
6.2 Arguments from Legal Analogies or Hypotheticals
702
6.3 Examples
703
6.4 Comparing Jurisprudential and Descriptive Accounts
707
7 Argument Schema for Legal Analogy
709
7.1 Argument Schemes for Case Analogies and Hypotheticals
710
7.2 Examples
714
7.3 Toward Computer Implementation
717
8 Special Argument Schemes for Statutes or Constitutions
717
9 Conclusions
720
References
720
Economic Logic and Legal Logic
722
1 Introduction
722
2 What Is Economic Logic?
724
2.1 Introduction
724
2.2 The Logic of (Some) Economic Explanation
725
2.3 The Logic of Economic Evaluation: Welfare Economics
727
3 Economic Logic as a Social Process Rather Than a Reasoning Process
734
3.1 The Power of Private Ordering
734
3.2 Blind Justice: The Social Processes of Legal Development
736
3.3 “Efficiency” on Collegial Courts
738
3.4 Legislative and Other Processes
738
4 Situated Legal Reasoning
739
5 The Logic of Legislation
740
6 The Logic of Administrative Agencies
741
6.1 The Theory of Cost-Benefit Analysis
742
6.2 Cost-Effectiveness
751
7 The Logic of Adjudication
752
8 Concluding Remarks
753
References
754
Index of Names
757
Index of Subjects
764