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Handbook of Legal Reasoning and Argumentation

Handbook of Legal Reasoning and Argumentation

Giorgio Bongiovanni, Gerald Postema, Antonino Rotolo, Giovanni Sartor, Chiara Valentini, Douglas Wal

 

Verlag Springer-Verlag, 2018

ISBN 9789048194520 , 773 Seiten

Format PDF, OL

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Handbook of Legal Reasoning and Argumentation


 

Contents

5

Contributors

7

Introduction

9

Basic Concepts for Legal Reasoning

24

Reasons (and Reasons in Philosophy of Law)

25

1 Premise

25

2 The Different Classes of Reasons: Normative, Motivating, Explanatory

26

2.1 Normative Reasons

28

2.2 Motivating Reasons

33

2.3 Explanatory Reasons

35

3 The Ontology of Reasons

37

4 Epistemic and Practical Reasons

41

5 The Modality (and Strength) of Reasons

43

5.1 Conflict and Weighing Between First-Order Reasons

44

5.2 First-Order Reasons and Second-Order (Exclusionary) Reasons

47

6 Reasons in (Philosophy of) Law

49

7 Concluding Remarks

53

References

53

Reasons in Moral Philosophy

56

1 What Is a Moral Reason?

56

2 Explanatory and Normative Reasons

57

3 The Issue of Agential Authority

58

4 Subjective and Objective Reasons

59

5 Personal and Impersonal Reasons: Integrity and Authenticity

60

6 Drawing the Boundaries of the Moral Domain

61

7 Moral Reasons and Moral Reasoning

62

8 Moral Reasons in Conflict

63

9 Moral Reasons and Coordination

64

10 Moral Reasons and Compliance

65

References

66

Legal Reasoning and Argumentation

68

1 Forms of Reasoning by Applying Rules to Cases

69

2 Case-Based Reasoning from Analogy

74

3 Reasoning and Argument

78

4 Reasoning by Drawing Inferences from Sources

82

5 Defeasible Logic

87

6 Reasoning, Argument, and Proof

89

7 Conclusions

94

References

94

Norms in Action: A Logical Perspective

97

1 Introduction

97

2 A Logic for Reasoning About Choices, Actions, and Time

102

3 Formalization of Responsibility and Influence

108

3.1 Responsibility

108

3.2 Influence

109

3.3 The Relationship Between Influence and Responsibility

112

4 Deontic Extension

113

5 Conclusion

118

References

119

Of Norms

122

1 Terminology and Overview

122

2 Normativity

123

2.1 Ought-to-Be and Ought-to-Do

123

2.2 Influencing and Guiding Behavior

124

2.3 Guidance by Norms: The Second-Person Point of View

126

2.4 Norms and Facts

127

3 Rules as Soft Constraints on Possible Worlds

127

3.1 Directions of Fit

128

3.2 Possible Worlds

130

3.3 Constraints

131

3.4 Rules as Soft Constraints

133

4 Kinds of Facts

134

4.1 Objective Facts

134

4.2 Brute Social Facts

135

4.3 Social Rules

136

4.4 Rule-Based Facts

137

4.5 Creation and Derogation

138

4.6 Factual and Descriptive Counterparts of Rules

139

4.7 Norm-Propositions

140

4.8 “Entailed” Norms

141

5 Deontic Facts

142

5.1 Deontic Facts and Motivation

142

5.2 Duties and Obligations

144

5.3 Being Obligated and Owing to Do Something

145

5.4 Permissions

146

5.5 The Anatomy of Ought-to-Do

148

6 Of Norms and Other Rules

150

6.1 Rules as Individuals in the Logical Sense

150

6.2 Dynamic Rules

151

6.3 Fact-to-Fact Rules

152

6.4 Counts-as Rules

152

6.5 Norms

153

6.6 Competence-, Power-, and Other Status-Conferring Rules

154

7 Summary

155

References

156

Values

158

1 Euthyphro Dilemma and Other Questions About Value

158

2 Aims and Desiderata for a Theory of Value

164

3 Some Substantive Questions About Value

166

4 Theories of Value

168

5 Value Disagreement

170

6 Pluralism and Incommensurability

173

7 Values and Rational Choice

178

8 Persons and Values

181

9 Values and Emotions

182

10 Valuing

184

References

186

The Goals of Norms

191

1 Goals–Norms: A Multiple Relation

193

2 Teleologies of Mind: Goals, Functions, and Pseudogoals

194

2.1 What Are Goals?

194

2.2 The Relations Between Psychological Goals and Behavior Functions

195

2.3 Goals Versus Pseudogoals

197

2.4 Subjective Kinds of Goals

198

3 Features of the Goal of an N

201

3.1 Impersonal

201

3.2 Avoidance

201

3.3 Meta-goals

202

3.4 Origin and Base of Norms: Norms Come from the Social Goals to Be Adopted

203

4 The Relationship Between the Mental and External Goals of Ns

204

4.1 Norm Functions and Goals

204

4.2 Subgoals

206

4.3 The Subject and N’s Aim

206

5 Concluding Remarks

207

References

208

Authority

209

1 Two Kinds of Authority: Epistemic and Practical

209

2 Power, de Facto Authority, and Legitimate Authority

210

3 Practical Authority as Personal

211

4 Practical Authority and Its Reason-Giving Capacity

215

5 Practical Authority and Its Capacity to Bind Subjects

217

6 The Kind of Reasons to Which Legitimate Directives Give Rise

219

7 The Justification of Practical Authority

227

References

234

The Authority of Law

236

1 Human Action and Authority: Tracing the Correct Relationship

238

2 Intentional Action Under the Guise of the Good

241

2.1 Aristotle’s Distinction Between Actuality and Potentiality

248

3 Law and Energeia: How Do Citizens Comply with Legal Rules?

251

References

256

Kinds of Reasoning and the Law

258

Deductive and Deontic Reasoning

259

1 Introduction

259

2 Deductive Reasoning

260

2.1 Deductive Reasoning—Logical Consequence as Deducibility

261

2.2 Deductive Reasoning—Logical Consequence as Entailment

266

3 Deontic Reasoning

267

3.1 Introduction

267

3.2 Obligations and Permissions: Basics

268

3.3 Facultativeness

269

3.4 Deontic Logic: Axiomatics and Semantics

272

3.5 Directed Obligations

277

4 Deontic Reasoning—Some Glimpses Beyond

280

4.1 Normative Systems

280

4.2 Normative Dynamics

285

References

287

Inductive, Abductive and Probabilistic Reasoning

291

1 Introduction

291

2 Tales of Woe and Reasoning

296

2.1 Putting Induction and Abduction into Context

298

2.2 Induction and Abduction in Law

305

3 A Primer in Probability Theory in Law

310

3.1 Probabilistic Conceptions of Evidential Value

312

3.2 The Language of Probability

315

4 Conclusion

325

References

326

Defeasibility in Law

330

1 The Idea of Defeasibility

330

2 Defeasibility in Reasoning and Nonmonotonic Inference

331

3 Conclusive and Defeasible Arguments

333

4 Linked Arguments and Convergent Argument Structures

335

5 Attacks Against Arguments: Rebutting and Undercutting

338

6 Rebutting and Undercutting in the Legal Domain

340

7 Levels of Abstraction of Arguments

343

8 Reinstatement

344

9 Dynamic Priorities

348

10 Patterns of Defeasible Reasoning

350

11 Legal Systems as Argumentation Bases

353

12 The Rationale for Defeasibility

356

13 Defeasible Reasoning and Probability

357

14 Defeasibility in the Law

359

15 Overcoming Legal Defeasibility?

361

16 The Emergence of the Idea of Defeasibility in Law and Ethics

364

17 The Idea of Defeasibility in Logic and AI

367

18 Defeasibility in Research on AI and Law

368

19 Defeasibility in Legal Theory

369

20 Conclusion

374

References

375

Analogical Arguments

380

1 The Many Faces of Analogy

380

2 The Architecture of Analogical Arguments

383

3 The Problem Situation

385

4 Prima Facie Similarity

387

5 Relevant Similarity

391

5.1 Relevant Similarity in Legal Analogical Arguments

391

5.2 Theory-Based Analogy

393

5.3 Factor-Based Analogy

396

6 Solution

398

References

399

Choosing Ends and Choosing Means: Teleological Reasoning in Law

401

1 Introduction

401

2 The Structure of Consequentialist Reasoning

403

2.1 The Structure of Evaluation

404

2.2 Rational Choice

405

2.3 Concluding Comments

414

3 Teleology and Instrumentalism

415

4 Choosing Ends

417

4.1 The Legislative Determination of Legal Ends

418

4.2 Interpretation and the Determination of Legal Ends

419

5 Choosing Means

420

5.1 Identifying Options

421

5.2 Choosing the Best Option

422

6 Concluding Remarks

424

References

425

Interactive Decision-Making and Morality

427

1 Introduction

427

2 Basic Information About Game Theory

428

2.1 Tasks and Branches of Game Theory

428

2.2 The Concept of a Game

428

2.3 The Assumptions of Classical Game Theory

429

2.4 Solution Concepts of Noncooperative Game Theory

430

2.5 Evolutionary Game Theory

432

3 Game Theory as a Tool for Better Understanding a Function of Morality

435

4 Game Theory as a Tool for Determining the Content of Moral Norms

439

5 Game Theory as a Tool for Criticizing Certain Moral Conceptions

440

6 Game Theory as a Tool for Analyzing the Problem of the Validity of Moral Norms

441

7 Game Theory as a Tool for Analyzing the Possibility of Deriving Morality from Instrumental Rationality

442

8 Game Theory as a Tool for Analyzing Moral Decision-Making

448

9 Game Theory as a Tool for Analyzing the Nature of Moral Dispositions

450

10 Game Theory as a Tool for Analyzing the Functions of Moral Emotions

453

11 Game Theory as a Tool for Analyzing the Cultural Evolution of Moral Norms

454

12 Conclusions

456

References

457

Special Kinds of Legal Reasoning

459

Evidential Reasoning

460

1 Setting the Stage

461

1.1 Eyewitness Testimony

461

1.2 DNA Evidence

462

1.3 Central Questions

463

2 Three Normative Frameworks

464

2.1 Arguments

464

2.2 Probabilities

465

2.3 Scenarios

466

3 Conflicting Evidence

467

3.1 Arguments

467

3.2 Scenarios

469

3.3 Probabilities

471

4 Evidential Value

473

4.1 Probability

473

4.2 Arguments

475

4.3 Scenarios

477

5 Coherently Interpreting the Evidence

479

5.1 Scenarios

479

5.2 Arguments

481

5.3 Probability

484

6 Reasoning and Decision Making

490

6.1 Probability

491

6.2 Arguments

492

6.3 Scenarios

493

7 Summary and Conclusion

495

7.1 Conflicting Evidence

495

7.2 Evidential Value

495

7.3 Coherently Interpreting the Evidence

496

7.4 Reasoning and Decision Making

496

8 Further Readings

496

8.1 Setting the Stage

497

8.2 Three Normative Frameworks

497

8.3 Conflicting Evidence

498

8.4 Evidential Value

498

8.5 Coherently Interpreting the Evidence

499

8.6 Reasoning and Decision Making

499

References

500

Interpretive Arguments and the Application of the Law

507

1 The Charm of Interpretation

507

2 General Scepticism About Legal Rules

511

3 The Communication Theory of Law

512

3.1 The Communication Theory of Legal Interpretation

514

4 Challenges to the Communication Theory

520

4.1 An Alternative Route for the Contribution Objection

522

5 Complex CT

524

6 Conclusion

526

References

527

Statutory Interpretation as Argumentation

530

1 Introduction

530

2 Interpretive Arguments

532

2.1 The Existing Types of Interpretive Arguments

532

2.2 Classifying Interpretive Arguments

535

3 Translating Interpretive Arguments into Schemes

537

3.1 Assumptions and Common Template

537

3.2 Positive Interpretive Schemes

538

3.3 Negative Interpretive Schemes

540

4 Attacking, Questioning, and Defending Interpretive Arguments

543

5 The Education Grants Example

546

6 Fitting Interpretive Schemes to Cases

552

7 Formalizing Interpretive Arguments—General Structure

558

8 Interpretive Arguments—A Formalization

562

9 Preference Arguments over Interpretive Arguments

564

10 From Best Interpretations to Individual Claims

565

11 Conclusions

568

References

569

Varieties of Vagueness in the Law

572

1 Varieties of Vagueness

572

2 Vagueness in the Legal Context

578

2.1 Ordinary Vagueness

579

2.2 Transparent Vagueness

582

2.3 Extravagant Vagueness

585

2.4 Ambiguity and Polysemy

587

2.5 Conversational Vagueness

589

References

591

Balancing, Proportionality and Constitutional Rights

592

1 Introduction

592

2 Rights, Balancing, Proportionality

593

3 Theories of the Connection Between Rights and Proportionality

594

3.1 Interest Theory and Balancing

594

3.2 Rights as Principles: Robert Alexy’s Theory

596

3.3 Rights and Limitations: Barak’s Analysis

598

3.4 Kai Möller: The Global Model of Constitutional Rights

599

4 Proportionality and Rights: The Critical Theses

601

4.1 Proportionality as a Teleological Approach: Rights as Fungible Goods

602

4.2 Proportionality and “Positive” and “Horizontal” Rights

604

5 Proportionality and Rights Adjudication

605

6 Proportionalism in Review

607

6.1 Proportionality Balancing and Means-Ends Proportionality

608

6.2 Proportionality Between Ad Hoc and Definitional Balancing

613

7 Proportionalism of Review

615

8 Alternative Approaches

618

References

620

A Quantitative Approach to Proportionality

624

1 Introduction

624

2 Quantitative Reasoning Without (Symbolically Expressed) Numbers

625

3 Basic Concepts

628

4 Impacts on Single Values

631

5 Pareto-Superiority

633

6 Comparative Evaluations Without Pareto-Superiority

634

7 Assessing Compliance with Value Norms

638

8 Teleological Reasoning and the Choice of Rules

642

9 Consistency in Balancing

644

10 Conclusions

645

References

646

Coherence and Systematization in Law

648

1 Introduction

648

2 Theories of Normative Coherence

649

2.1 Principle-Based Theories

650

2.2 Case-Based Theories

651

2.3 Constraint-Satisfaction Theories

651

3 Objections to Legal Coherentism

652

3.1 The Vagueness Problem

652

3.2 What Is Coherence-Driven Inference?

653

3.3 The Circularity Objection

655

3.4 Coherence Versus Authority

656

3.5 Coherence and Legal Conservatism

657

3.6 The Alternative Coherent Systems Objection

659

3.7 The Problems of Holistic Coherentism

661

3.8 Value Pluralism, Conflict, and Coherence

662

3.9 Coherence and Truth in Law

663

4 The Coherence Bias: A Plea for Responsibilist Coherentism

666

5 The Value of Coherence

670

5.1 The Argument from Antifoundationalism

671

5.2 Coherence and Emotion

671

5.3 The Argument from Psychological Plausibility

672

5.4 The Argument from the Dynamics of Justification

672

5.5 The Epistemic Value of Coherence

673

5.6 The Practical Value of Coherence

673

5.7 The Argument from the Social Function of Coherence

674

5.8 The Argument from Conflict Resolution

675

5.9 The Constitutive Value of Coherence

676

6 Conclusions

676

References

678

Precedent and Legal Analogy

684

1 Introduction

684

2 Reasoning from Precedent

687

2.1 Nature of Precedential Constraint

687

2.2 How Much Precedential Constraint Is Enough?

689

2.3 Precedential Constraint and Characterization

689

3 Argument from Legal Analogy

691

4 Arguments from Hypotheticals, a Kind of Legal Analogy

694

5 Roles of Differences, Similarities, and Rules in Precedent and Legal Analogy

695

6 Arguments in Practice for Following Precedent or Legal Analogy

700

6.1 Arguments for Following/Departing from Precedent

701

6.2 Arguments from Legal Analogies or Hypotheticals

702

6.3 Examples

703

6.4 Comparing Jurisprudential and Descriptive Accounts

707

7 Argument Schema for Legal Analogy

709

7.1 Argument Schemes for Case Analogies and Hypotheticals

710

7.2 Examples

714

7.3 Toward Computer Implementation

717

8 Special Argument Schemes for Statutes or Constitutions

717

9 Conclusions

720

References

720

Economic Logic and Legal Logic

722

1 Introduction

722

2 What Is Economic Logic?

724

2.1 Introduction

724

2.2 The Logic of (Some) Economic Explanation

725

2.3 The Logic of Economic Evaluation: Welfare Economics

727

3 Economic Logic as a Social Process Rather Than a Reasoning Process

734

3.1 The Power of Private Ordering

734

3.2 Blind Justice: The Social Processes of Legal Development

736

3.3 “Efficiency” on Collegial Courts

738

3.4 Legislative and Other Processes

738

4 Situated Legal Reasoning

739

5 The Logic of Legislation

740

6 The Logic of Administrative Agencies

741

6.1 The Theory of Cost-Benefit Analysis

742

6.2 Cost-Effectiveness

751

7 The Logic of Adjudication

752

8 Concluding Remarks

753

References

754

Index of Names

757

Index of Subjects

764