Black Thursday - The Story of the Schweinfurt Raid

EVEN EXPERIENCED VETERANS of strategic air warfare in the European Theater of Operations found it difficult to believe, in October, 1943, that only fourteen months had passed since the first American heavy bombers had ventured forth from British soil into the skies over German-dominated Europe.

At thirty-nine minutes past three o’clock in the afternoon of August 17, 1942, the last of 12 B-17E Flying Fortresses[I] of Colonel Frank K. Armstrong’s 97th Bomb Group, first American heavy bomber unit to arrive in England, lifted from the main runway of the American airdrome at Grafton Underwood. The names of these giant four-engine raiders spoke of crew enthusiasm—Baby Doll, Peggy D., Big Stuff, Butcher Shop, Yankee Doodle, Berlin Sleeper, Johnny Reb, Birmingham Blitzkrieg, Alabama Exterminator.

THE BOMBERS ASSEMBLED in tight formation, and in a steady climb wheeled for the English Channel, pointing their noses toward the target in France—the city of Rouen. Four Royal Air Force squadrons of Spitfire IX fighter planes flew close escort to the target area. Five Spitfire IX squadrons picked up the bombers as they left the smoking target, and escorted them back to England.

In that first attack by American heavy bombers in the European Theater of Operations, the tiny force dropped a total of 36,900 pounds of bombs from an altitude of 23,000 feet. Approximately half the bombs fell in the target area.

Anti-aircraft fire inflicted slight damage on two bombers. Three Messerschmitt Me-109 fighters[I] attacked the formation, but failed to damage any of the B-17’s. The only casualties of the Flying Fortress debut over Europe occurred on the return flight from the target. A bombardier and navigator of one B-17 were slightly injured when a pigeon smashed itself against the Plexiglas nose and showered the crewmen with flying particles.

THE TARGET—THE SOTTEVILLE marshaling yard in Rouen, with its large locomotive depot and rolling-stock repair shops of the Buddicum concern—was not seriously damaged, and operations were affected only negligibly. The attack, however, was immeasurably more important in terms of policy decisions for the United States than it could possibly have been in respect to the bombed marshaling yard. For behind the 12 bombers as they droned over France lay a story of long debate and bitter controversy.

In this summer of 1942 the strategic and logistic plans of the Allies, most especially those concerning the proposed aerial bombardment by the Army Air Forces of occupied Europe and Germany, floundered in a state of extreme uncertainty. That Germany must be subjected at the earliest opportunity to the greatest possible weight of heavy aerial attack was beyond dispute. The question around which revolved the uncertainty of decision was to what extent the United States would commit it heavy bombardment strength to Europe at the expense of offensive operations in the Pacific, where the Japanese still enjoyed the heights of their overwhelming victories.

As part of the preparation for the invasion of Nazi-occupied France under the code name of BOLERO, the United States during the spring of 1942 committed its operational planning to building up a major heavy bombardment striking force in the British Isles, with the goal of eventually crippling the German war machine. On January 28, 1942, the Army Air Forces had activated the Eighth Air Force; three months later, in April, the Eighth was committed to BOLERO. One month later, in May, the paper plans assumed initial substance, when advance units of the fledgling air command—which was to become the most powerful striking force in the world—crossed the Atlantic and arrived in England. It was a harrowing transfer of air power to an advanced base, for the Flying Fortresses and the Liberators had to fight wild Atlantic storms, and more than a few bombers and their crews disappeared in the reaches of the angry ocean expanse.

The early life of the new command was essentially a frenzied nightmare of jumbled logistics and shortage of men and planes. Under the leadership of Major General Carl A. Spaatz, the Eighth was organized into bomber, fighter, composite (training), and service commands. General Spaatz’s headquarters for the Eighth Air Force was located in the suburbs of London, at Bushy Park, Teddington, and carried the coded designation of WIDEWING.

To Brigadier General Ira C. Eaker went all the headaches of the Eighth’s initial bomber force, the VIII Bomber Command. On April 15 General Eaker established his headquarters for the Bomber Command in a girls’ school (from which the students and other tenants had been hurriedly evacuated) at High WycombeI in Buckinghamshire, some thirty miles west of London.

THIS HEADQUARTERS BECAME well known by its code name of PINETREE.[I]

Easing the burden of Eaker’s problems was the superb cooperation offered by the British. The Royal Air Force Bomber Command was a combat-proven organization, and its growing strength and skill in air operations were beginning to exert a telling effect upon Germany’s industrial war machine.

While the forces under Eaker were still embryonic and struggling to gain some semblance of aircraft strength, the British were hammering with massive blows at Germany.

Those were the days when the Bomber Command of the Royal Air Force was hurling massed waves of bombers at the industrial might of the Ruhr, and when the heavyweights of that command—the Stirlings, Halifaxes, and Lancasters—began to lift bomb tonnages well above a thousand to two thousand tons per raid. The Royal Air Force’s campaign of aerial attack against Germany was accomplished fact, as were the increasing number and violence of the raids against the enemy.

EARLY IN 1942 BRITISH authorities began their build-up of the airdromes and installations that would house and maintain the many elements of the Eighth Air Force. If there were differences of opinion and at moments some bitter arguments, these arose more from the vexing problems created by the Americans’ constantly changing their plans than from any vacillation in operations on the part of the British.

To meet the requirements of its varied organizations, the Eighth Air Force received from the British a total of 127 airdromes and all other installations and facilities necessary to sustain the bombers, fighters, service, and maintenance units, and supporting organizations.

As for the growing pains of the VIII Bomber Command, they arose almost inevitably from the rapidly growing size and changing organization of the command. The British, however managed the greater portion of the time to keep pace with the needs of the American units that flooded into England.

Originally the proposals set forth under mutual agreement stated that the VIII Bomber Command would take over from the Royal Air Force five areas in the region of East Anglia; northeast of London, with 15 airdromes contained within each area. In addition, the VIII would also assume tenancy of all satellite airfields that might be necessary to accommodate additional aircraft, personnel, and facilities for operations.

By May 1942, the British and Americans were in agreement on the location of the bomber airdromes. Into the Huntingdon area and adjacent sections of East Anglia went the Army Air Forces heavy bombers, and the airdromes of Grafton Underwood, Thurleigh, Molesworth, Little Staughton, Kimbolton, Polebrook, Chelveston, and Podington became the “veterans” of VIII Bomber Command.

There is ample evidence of the outstanding cooperation afforded the American bombing organization by our British Allies. In General Eaker’s report of June 19, 1942, to General Spaatz, he wrote of the British that they had “cooperated 100 percent in every regard. They have lent us personnel when we had none, and have furnished us clerical and administrative staffs; they have furnished us liaison officers for Intelligence, Operations, and Supply; they have furnished us transportation; they have housed and fed our people and they have answered promptly and willingly all our requisitions; in addition they have made available to us for study their most secret devices and documents. We are extremely proud of the relations we have been able...