Market Design Powers of the European Commission? - Remedies under Articles 7 and 9 Regulation 1/03

Preface

Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Delimitation of the Subject Matter

1.1.1 Distinction from Other Means to Enforce Articles 101 and 102 TFEU

1.1.2 Distinction from Similar Powers in the Fields of Anti-dumping, State Aid and Article 106 TFEU

1.1.3 Distinction from Merger Remedies

1.1.4 No Comparative Study

1.1.5 No Study of General Usefulness of Remedies, nor of Political or Economic Expediency

1.2 Terminology

1.2.1 Remedy

1.2.2 Structural and Behavioural Remedies

1.3 The Importance of Soft-Law

1.4 Outline

Bibliography

Chapter 2: Prolegomena

2.1 Fundamentals Regarding Article 7 and Article 9 as Legal Bases for the Adoption of a Remedy

2.1.1 Article 7

2.1.2 Article 9

2.1.3 Distinction of the Article 9 Procedure from the Settlement Procedure in Cartel Cases

2.2 The Alrosa Case and Its Criticism

2.2.1 The Case

2.2.1.1 The Facts

2.2.1.2 The Judgment of the General Court

2.2.1.2.1 Violation of Article 9 and the Principle of Proportionality

2.2.1.2.2 Violation of Alrosa´s Rights of Defence

2.2.1.3 The Opinion of Advocate General Kokott

2.2.1.3.1 Violation of Article 9 and of the Principle of Proportionality

2.2.1.3.1.1 Too Strict Proportionality Test

2.2.1.3.1.2 Excess of the Limits of Judicial Review

2.2.1.3.2 Violation of Alrosa´s Rights of Defence

2.2.1.4 The Judgment of the Court of Justice

2.2.1.4.1 Violation of Article 9 and of the Principle of Proportionality

2.2.1.4.1.1 Too Strict Proportionality Test

2.2.1.4.1.2 Excess of the Limits of Judicial Review

2.2.1.4.2 Violation of Alrosa´s Rights of Defence

2.2.2 Essential Criticism and Preliminary Comment

2.2.2.1 Summary of the Criticism Regarding the Modified Proportionality Test

2.2.2.2 Comment

2.2.2.2.1 The Judgment Is Generalisable Only to a Limited Extent

2.2.2.2.2 The Modification of the Proportionality Test Applied by the Court Raises at Most Limited Concerns Regarding the Inte...

2.2.2.2.2.1 Interests of Concerned Undertakings

2.2.2.2.2.2 Interests of Third Parties

2.2.2.2.2.3 Interest of the General Public in the Protection of the Competitive Process

2.2.2.2.3 Intermediate Conclusion on the Modification of the Proportionality Test in the Alrosa Judgment

2.3 The Broader Context: The Development of the Commission´s Practice and the Explanations for the Frequent Occurrence of Comm...

2.3.1 Development of the Practice: A Shift Towards a ``Culture of Consent´´?

2.3.1.1 Empirical Observations

2.3.1.1.1 Regarding Commission Decisions

2.3.1.1.2 Regarding Court Procedures

2.3.1.2 A Change of Paradigm?

2.3.2 Explanations for the Frequent Occurrence of Commitment Decisions

2.3.2.1 Incentives and Disincentives for a Commitment Decision

2.3.2.1.1 Incentives

2.3.2.1.1.1 Commitments Are Speedier and Less Costly Than Infringement Decisions

2.3.2.1.1.2 Commitments Are More Effective Than Infringement Decisions

2.3.2.1.2 Disincentives

2.3.2.1.3 Intermediate Conclusion

2.3.2.2 Replacement of Exemption Decisions That Existed Under Regulation 17/62

2.3.2.3 The Impact of the More Economic Approach

2.3.3 Conclusion

Bibliography

Chapter 3: The Relaxation of the Link Between Harm and Remedy

3.1 Introduction

3.1.1 The Importance of the Link Between Harm and Remedy in the Context of Article 7: A Barrier Against the Blurring of the Bo...

3.1.1.1 The ``General Clause´´ Character of Article 7 and the Difficulties of Defining Limits for the Content of an Article 7 ...

3.1.1.2 The Link Between Harm and Remedy As a Barrier Against the Blurring of the Boundaries Between Competition Law and Regul...

3.1.2 The Criticism Regarding the Relaxation of the Link Between Harm and Remedy in the Context of the Article 9 Procedure: A ...

3.1.2.1 Abstract Risk of Enforcement Errors

3.1.2.2 Abstract Risk of Abuse of Commitments for Regulatory Purposes

3.1.2.3 The Materialisation of the Risks of Enforcement Errors and Instrumentalisation of the Commitment Procedure for Regulat...

3.1.3 Preliminary Comment and Outline of the Remainder of the Present Chapter

3.1.3.1 Article 9 Only Increases the Abstract Risk of Over-Enforcement

3.1.3.1.1 No Increase in Risk of Under-Enforcement

3.1.3.1.1.1 The Interests of Third Parties Who Are Capable of Ensuring Their Rights Themselves

3.1.3.1.1.2 The Interest of the General Public in the Protection of the Competitive Process

3.1.3.1.2 There Is an Increase in Risk of Over-Enforcement

3.1.3.2 Development of a Research Agenda

3.1.3.2.1 Importance of Clarifying the Boundaries of Article 7

3.1.3.2.2 The Commission´s Use of Novel Theories of Harm or the Pursuit of Regulatory Objectives Prove As Such Neither Over-En...

3.1.3.2.3 Limitations and Outline of the Following Analysis

3.1.3.2.3.1 Limitations

3.1.3.2.3.2 Outline

3.2 General Remarks on Proportionality

3.2.1 In the Context of Article 7

3.2.1.1 The Structure of the Test: Two or Three Steps?

3.2.1.2 Relation Between the Intrusiveness of a Remedy and Its Effectiveness

3.2.1.3 Importance of Monitoring Costs

3.2.1.4 Remedies Addressing a Market or Conduct That Is Not Covered by the Found Infringement

3.2.2 In the Context of Article 9

3.2.2.1 General Observations

3.2.2.2 Coca-Cola

3.2.2.2.1 The Case

3.2.2.2.2 The Criticism

3.2.2.2.3 Comment

3.3 The Link Between Harm and Remedy Under Article 7 and Article 9 in General

3.3.1 Terminating On-Going Anticompetitive Conduct

3.3.1.1 Abstract Cease and Desist Orders

3.3.1.2 Concrete Negative Orders

3.3.1.3 Similar Conduct

3.3.1.3.1 Abstract Like Effects Orders

3.3.1.3.2 Concrete Obligations That Aim at Preventing Similar Conduct

3.3.1.3.2.1 Exchange of Information

3.3.1.3.2.2 Microsoft Tying

3.3.1.3.2.3 Single Branding Obligations

3.3.1.3.2.3.1 In the Context of Article 7 Regulation 1/03

3.3.1.3.2.3.1 Langnese

3.3.1.3.2.3.1 Langfristige Gaslieferverträge

3.3.1.3.2.3.1 Discussion

3.3.1.3.2.3.2 In the Context of Article 9 Regulation 1/03

3.3.1.3.2.3.2 Distrigaz and Long-Term Electricity Contracts in France

3.3.1.3.2.3.2 Repsol

3.3.1.4 Positive Orders and the Freedom of Choice of the Concerned Undertakings

3.3.1.4.1 In the Context of Article 7 Regulation 1/03

3.3.1.4.1.1 Positive Orders for Infringements of Article 101 TFEU

3.3.1.4.1.1.1 Case Law

3.3.1.4.1.1.1 Ford I

3.3.1.4.1.1.1 Peugeot

3.3.1.4.1.1.1 Automec

3.3.1.4.1.1.1 Depotkosmetik

3.3.1.4.1.1.2 Discussion

3.3.1.4.1.1.2 The Potential Field of Application of Positive Orders for Infringements of Article 101 TFEU: Constellations in W...

3.3.1.4.1.1.2 The Compatibility of Positive Orders with the Freedom of Choice of the Concerned Undertakings

3.3.1.4.1.1.2 Positive Orders to Eliminate the Subsisting Effects of an Infringement of Article 101 TFEU

3.3.1.4.1.1.2 Conclusion: A Look Back at Selective Distribution Systems

3.3.1.4.1.2 Positive Orders for Infringements of Article 102 TFEU

3.3.1.4.1.2.1 Orders Requiring Positive Action Where There Are Several Ways to Put the Abuse to an End

3.3.1.4.1.2.2 Orders Requiring Positive Action Where the Latter Constitutes the Only Way to Put the Abuse to an End: The Typic...

3.3.1.4.1.2.2 The Commission Must Respect the Parties´ Freedom of Choice As Regards the Implementation of an Obligation to Deal

3.3.1.4.1.2.2 A Distinction Between Rupture of On-Going Supply and Refusal to Supply a New Customer?

3.3.1.4.1.2.2 Scope for Specific Orders Regarding the Implementation of a Positive Obligation

3.3.1.4.2 In the Context of Article 9 Regulation 1/03

3.3.1.5 The Scope of Remedies and Article 101(3) TFEU

3.3.1.5.1 In the Context of Article 7

3.3.1.5.1.1 MIFs and the Remedy Imposed in Mastercard

3.3.1.5.1.1.1 General Remarks Regarding the Treatment of MIFs Under EU Competition Law

3.3.1.5.1.1.2 The Remedy Imposed in Mastercard

3.3.1.5.1.2 The Remedy Imposed in Cartes Bancaires

3.3.1.5.1.3 Discussion

3.3.1.5.1.3.1 Comparison of the Mastercard and the Cartes Bancaires Judgments

3.3.1.5.1.3.2 Can the Commission Prohibit Practices for Which It Has Not Yet Been Clarified Whether They Meet the Requirements...

3.3.1.5.2 In the Context of Article 9 Regulation 1/03

3.3.1.5.2.1 General Observations

3.3.1.5.2.2 The Premier League Commitment and the ``No-Single Buyer´´ Rule

3.3.1.5.2.2.1 The Case

3.3.1.5.2.2.2 Discussion of Criticism

3.3.1.6 Remedies with Respect to Prices

3.3.1.6.1 Exclusionary Pricing Practices

3.3.1.6.1.1 In the Context of Article 7 Regulation 1/03

3.3.1.6.1.1.1 Predatory Pricing

3.3.1.6.1.1.1 The Prohibition of Predatory Pricing

3.3.1.6.1.1.1 The Remedies Side: Fixing a Minimum Price

3.3.1.6.1.1.1 ``Germania´´ As an Atypical Example

3.3.1.6.1.1.1 The Lufthansa/Austrian Airlines Cooperation Agreement

3.3.1.6.1.1.2 Rebates

3.3.1.6.1.1.2 Tetra Pak II

3.3.1.6.1.1.2 Irish Sugar

3.3.1.6.1.1.2 Comment

3.3.1.6.1.1.3 Margin Squeeze

3.3.1.6.1.1.3 The Prohibition

3.3.1.6.1.1.3 The Remedies Side

3.3.1.6.1.2 In the Context of Article 9

3.3.1.6.2 Exploitative Pricing Practices

3.3.1.6.2.1 In the Context of Article 7

3.3.1.6.2.2 In the Context of Article 9

3.3.1.6.2.2.1 Rambus

3.3.1.6.2.2.1 The Case

3.3.1.6.2.2.1 Discussion of Criticism

3.3.1.6.2.2.2 Standard and Poor´s

3.3.1.6.2.2.2 The Case

3.3.1.6.2.2.2 Discussion of Criticism

3.3.1.6.2.2.3 Gazprom

3.3.1.7 Microsoft Tying: An Unbundling Remedy Under Article 7 vs a Must Carry Remedy Under Article 9

3.3.1.7.1 The Theory of Harm

3.3.1.7.2 The Remedies

3.3.2 Addressing Imminent Anticompetitive Conduct

3.3.3 Eliminating the Causes of Future Anticompetitive Conduct

3.3.4 Eliminating the Subsisting Effects of Past Anticompetitive Conduct

3.3.4.1 In the Context of Article 7

3.3.4.1.1 General Remarks

3.3.4.1.1.1 Akzo

3.3.4.1.1.2 Ufex

3.3.4.1.1.3 Generalisation of Akzo and Ufex

3.3.4.1.1.3.1 Further Examples of Remedies That Aim at the Elimination of Subsisting Effects

3.3.4.1.1.3.2 The Boundaries of the Commission´s Power: Required Proof of Causality Between Infringement, Actual Harm and Reme...

3.3.4.1.2 Follow-On Contracts

3.3.4.1.3 Disgorgement, Restitution and Compensation

3.3.4.2 In the Context of Article 9 Regulation 1/03

3.3.4.2.1 The ``Competitive Reset´´ in E-Books

3.3.4.2.1.1 The Case

3.3.4.2.1.2 Discussion

3.3.4.2.2 Disgorgement, Restitution and Compensation in the Context of Article 9

3.4 In Particular: So Called Structural Remedies

3.4.1 The Irrelevance of the Distinction in the Context of Article 7

3.4.1.1 The Impossibility to Distinguish Between Structural and Behavioural Remedies

3.4.1.1.1 Doctrine

3.4.1.1.2 Position of Commission

3.4.1.1.3 Position of EU Courts

3.4.1.1.4 Comment

3.4.1.2 The Lack of Necessity of a Distinction: No General Subsidiarity of Structural Measures

3.4.1.2.1 Subsidiarity of Structural Remedies and the Principles of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU

3.4.1.2.1.1 Anticompetitive Conduct Consists of a Change to the Structure of the Undertaking

3.4.1.2.1.2 Structure of Undertaking Is a Cause for Anticompetitive Conduct

3.4.1.2.1.2.1 The Conditions for the Compatibility of a Structural Remedy That Aims at the Causes of Abusive Conduct with the ...

3.4.1.2.1.2.2 Consequences for the Subsidiarity Hypotheses

3.4.1.2.1.2.2 Separate Accounts As a Remedy for a Margin Squeeze

3.4.1.2.1.2.2 IP Licenses As a Remedy for Excessive Pricing

3.4.1.2.1.3 Structure of Undertaking Constitutes the Consequence of Anticompetitive Conduct

3.4.1.2.1.4 Conclusion

3.4.1.2.2 Subsidiarity of Structural Remedies and Proportionality

3.4.1.2.2.1 Are Generalised Assumptions About the Intrusiveness and Effectiveness of Structural and Behavioural Remedies Possi...

3.4.1.2.2.1.1 Can Structural Remedies Be Considered As Generally More Burdensome?

3.4.1.2.2.1.2 Can Structural Remedies Be considered to Be Generally More Effective?

3.4.1.2.2.2 Can the Advantages of a More Burdensome Structural Remedy in Terms of Effectiveness Justify Its Imposition Despite...

3.4.1.2.3 Concluding Example: Nord KS/Xella

3.4.2 Evaluation of the Criticism Regarding Structural Remedies Under Article 9

3.4.2.1 Energy Sector

3.4.2.1.1 Vertical Unbundling Through Divestiture of Transmission Grids

3.4.2.1.1.1 The Three Commitments and Their Criticism

3.4.2.1.1.1.1 E.On

3.4.2.1.1.1.1 The Case

3.4.2.1.1.1.1 Discussion of Criticism

3.4.2.1.1.1.2 RWE

3.4.2.1.1.1.2 The Case

3.4.2.1.1.1.2 Discussion of Criticism

3.4.2.1.1.1.3 ENI

3.4.2.1.1.1.3 The Case

3.4.2.1.1.1.3 Discussion of Criticism

3.4.2.1.1.2 Overall Comment on the Divestiture of Transmission Grids

3.4.2.1.2 Horizontal Unbundling

3.4.2.1.2.1 E.On

3.4.2.1.2.1.1 The Case

3.4.2.1.2.1.2 Discussion of Criticism

3.4.2.1.2.1.2 Sadowska´s Criticism of the Commission´s Theory of Harm

3.4.2.1.2.1.2 Criticism Regarding the Link Between Harm and Remedy

3.4.2.1.2.2 E.On Gas and GDF

3.4.2.1.2.2.1 The Cases

3.4.2.1.2.2.2 Discussion of Criticism

3.4.2.1.2.3 CEZ

3.4.2.1.2.3.1 The Case

3.4.2.1.2.3.2 Discussion of Criticism

3.4.2.1.3 Swedish Interconnectors

3.4.2.1.3.1 The Case

3.4.2.1.3.2 Discussion of Criticism

3.4.2.1.4 Conclusion Regarding the ``Structural´´ Remedies in the Energy Sector

3.4.2.2 Aviation Sector

3.4.2.2.1 Limited Value of Contrasting ``Structural Control´´ and ``Behavioural Control´´

3.4.2.2.2 No Doubts As Regards the Fundamental Possibility to Impose Slot Releases Under Article 7

3.4.2.3 Deutsche Bahn

3.4.2.3.1 The Case

3.4.2.3.2 Discussion of Criticism

3.5 Ancillary Remedies

3.5.1 Information of Customers

3.5.2 Reporting to the Commission

3.5.3 Delegation of the Implementation of a Remedy

3.5.3.1 The Practice of the Commission

3.5.3.1.1 Trustees

3.5.3.1.1.1 Tasks and Powers of Trustees

3.5.3.1.1.1.1 General Tasks and Powers

3.5.3.1.1.1.2 Specific Tasks and Powers

3.5.3.1.1.1.2 Divestiture

3.5.3.1.1.1.2 Non-divestiture

3.5.3.1.1.1.3 Overall Development of the Tasks and Powers Conferred on Trustees in the Commission´s Practice

3.5.3.1.1.2 Appointment, Qualifications, Remuneration and Discharge

3.5.3.1.1.3 Relations with Market Participants and the Commission

3.5.3.1.1.3.1 The Trustee´s Independence from Market Participants

3.5.3.1.1.3.1 Independence from the Addressee of the Remedy

3.5.3.1.1.3.1 Independence from Other Market Participants and Consequences of a Lack of Independence

3.5.3.1.1.3.2 The Trustee´s Submission Under the Influence of the Commission

3.5.3.1.2 ADR

3.5.3.1.2.1 Main Types of ADR Mechanisms Used for the Implementation of Remedies

3.5.3.1.2.1.1 Mediation

3.5.3.1.2.1.2 Arbitration

3.5.3.1.2.1.3 Expert Determination

3.5.3.1.2.2 Role of the Commission in Arbitration Procedures

3.5.3.1.2.2.1 Information of the Commission About Arbitration Procedures

3.5.3.1.2.2.2 Possibilities for the Commission to Participate in the Arbitration Procedures

3.5.3.1.2.2.3 Relation Between the Commission´s Own Enforcement Powers and the Arbitral Procedure

3.5.3.2 The Microsoft I Judgment and Its Implications

3.5.3.2.1 The Case

3.5.3.2.2 Discussion

3.5.3.2.2.1 The Trustee´s Investigative Powers and His Independence from the Commission

3.5.3.2.2.1.1 Conflict with the Meroni Doctrine

3.5.3.2.2.1.2 Conflict with Protection of Individual Rights

3.5.3.2.2.2 The Allocation of Costs

3.5.3.2.2.2.1 Conflict with the Public Interest in an Effective Enforcement of Competition Law

3.5.3.2.2.2.2 Conflict with the Interest of the Undertaking That Has to Bear the Costs

3.5.3.2.2.3 Conclusion

3.6 Fundamental Rights and the Scope of EU Law As Further Limitations to the Commission´s Powers

3.6.1 Fundamental Rights

3.6.1.1 The Right to Property and the Requirement of Compensation

3.6.1.2 Fundamental Rights and the Consensual Nature of Article 9 Decisions

3.6.2 Scope of EU Law

3.6.2.1 The Internal Perspective: Appreciable Effect on Competition and on Trade Between Member States

3.6.2.2 The External Perspective: The International Dimension of Competition Law

3.6.2.2.1 The International Dimension of a Case As a Limit for the Commission´s Remedial Power

3.6.2.2.1.1 Jurisdiction

3.6.2.2.1.1.1 Subject Matter Jurisdiction

3.6.2.2.1.1.1 In General

3.6.2.2.1.1.1 Regarding Remedies

3.6.2.2.1.1.2 The Enforcement Problem

3.6.2.2.1.2 Lack of Necessity of a Domestic Remedy Due to an Existing Foreign Remedy

3.6.2.2.2 International Cooperation

3.6.2.2.3 Does the Commission Use the Article 9 Procedure to Extract Remedies That Reach Beyond Its Jurisdiction?

3.7 Duration and Modification

3.7.1 Ex Ante Limitation of the Effects of a Remedy

3.7.1.1 In the Context of Article 7

3.7.1.2 In the Context of Article 9

3.7.2 Ex Post Amendment of Remedies

3.7.2.1 The Legal Bases for the Ex Post Amendment of Remedies

3.7.2.1.1 In the Context of Article 7: The General Principles of EU Administrative Law

3.7.2.1.1.1 Acts That Were Unlawfully Adopted

3.7.2.1.1.2 Acts That Were Lawfully Adopted

3.7.2.1.2 Article 9(2)

3.7.2.1.2.1 Exhaustiveness?

3.7.2.1.2.1.1 Article 9(2) Is More Restrictive Than the General Principles of EU Administrative Law

3.7.2.1.2.1.2 Article 9(2) Is Not Exhaustive

3.7.2.1.2.2 Not Only Power to Reopen, but Also Power to Modify

3.7.2.1.2.2.1 No Amendment of a Commitment Without the Consent of the Company That Offered It

3.7.2.1.2.2.2 Ex Nunc or Ex Tunc Revocation

3.7.2.2 Common Questions Regarding Articles 7 and 9

3.7.2.2.1 Discretion vs Obligation to Reopen the Procedure

3.7.2.2.1.1 Obligation to Withdraw or Amend an Unlawfully Adopted, Burdensome Remedy if There Are No Opposing Legitimate Expec...

3.7.2.2.1.2 Obligation to Revoke or Amend a Remedy in Favour of the Addressee Despite Favourable Effects for Third Parties

3.7.2.2.1.3 Obligation to Revoke or Amend a Remedy to the Detriment of the Addressee

3.7.2.2.2 Importance of the Change of Circumstances Required

3.7.2.2.3 Review Provisions

3.8 Conclusion on the Relaxation of the Link Between Harm and Remedy

Bibliography

Chapter 4: The Relaxation of Procedural Safeguards

4.1 Procedural Safeguards During the Administrative Procedure

4.1.1 Concerned Undertakings

4.1.1.1 In the Context of Article 7

4.1.1.1.1 General Presentation of the Rights of Defence of the Concerned Undertakings

4.1.1.1.2 Transatlantic Container Line

4.1.1.2 In the Context of Article 9

4.1.1.2.1 In Cases with a Statement of Objections

4.1.1.2.2 In Cases Without a Statement of Objections

4.1.1.2.2.1 Preliminary Assessment

4.1.1.2.2.2 Access to the File

4.1.1.2.2.2.1 Summary of the Controversy

4.1.1.2.2.2.2 Comment

4.1.1.2.2.2.2 Existence of a Right to Access to the File

4.1.1.2.2.2.2 Possibility for Concerned Undertakings to Waive Their Right to Access to the File

4.1.1.2.2.3 Hearing

4.1.1.2.2.4 Information About Outcome of the Market Test

4.1.2 Complainants

4.1.2.1 In the Context of Article 7

4.1.2.2 In the Context of Article 9

4.1.3 Other Natural or Legal Persons

4.1.3.1 Grundig and Consten

4.1.3.2 Procedural Rights During the Administrative Procedure Under Regulations 1/03 and 773/2004 de lege lata

4.1.3.2.1 In the Context of Article 7

4.1.3.2.2 In the Context of Article 9

4.1.3.2.2.1 The Right of Interested Third Parties to Be Heard on a Given Commitment

4.1.3.2.2.2 The Right of Interested Third Parties to Be Heard on a Revised Commitment

4.1.3.2.2.2.1 Alrosa

4.1.3.2.2.2.2 The Best Practices and the Manual of Procedures

4.1.3.2.2.2.3 Intermediate Conclusion

4.1.3.3 De lege ferenda: A Need for Market Testing Article 7 Remedies?

4.1.3.4 Necessity to Carry Out a Market Test for the Ex Post Revocation or Amendment of an Article 9 Remedy

4.1.4 The Role of the Hearing Officer

4.1.5 Conclusion on the Administrative Procedure

4.2 Judicial Review

4.2.1 Admissibility

4.2.1.1 Concerned Undertakings

4.2.1.1.1 In the Context of Article 7

4.2.1.1.2 In the Context of Article 9

4.2.1.1.2.1 Actions Directed Against Commitments Made Binding by the Commission

4.2.1.1.2.1.1 Reviewable Act?

4.2.1.1.2.1.2 Lack of Legal Interest in a Challenge Due to Consent?

4.2.1.1.2.2 Actions Directed Against the Commission´s Refusal to Accept a Commitment

4.2.1.2 Complainants

4.2.1.2.1 In the Context of Article 7

4.2.1.2.2 In the Context of Article 9

4.2.1.3 Other Third Parties

4.2.1.3.1 Is the Exercise of a Procedural Right During the Administrative Procedure a Necessary Condition for Individual Conce...

4.2.1.3.1.1 The Development of the Case Law

4.2.1.3.1.1.1 Case Law Prior to the Kruidvat Case

4.2.1.3.1.1.2 Kruidvat and Its Potential Scope of Application

4.2.1.3.1.1.2 The Case

4.2.1.3.1.1.2 The Potential Scope of Application

4.2.1.3.1.1.3 Case Law Following the Kruidvat Case

4.2.1.3.1.1.3 State Aid: Sniace

4.2.1.3.1.1.3 Merger Control: ASBL

4.2.1.3.1.2 Conclusion

4.2.1.3.2 Is the Participation in the Administrative Procedure or a Right to Participate Sufficient to Establish Individual Co...

4.2.1.3.2.1 Participation As Such Not Sufficient

4.2.1.3.2.2 Existence of Participatory Right Sufficient

4.2.1.3.3 Individual Concern Irrespective of Procedural Rights

4.2.2 Scope of Review

4.2.2.1 General Observations

4.2.2.1.1 The Right to Effective Legal Protection Pursuant to Article 6(1) ECHR and Article 47 Charter

4.2.2.1.1.1 General Remarks

4.2.2.1.1.1.1 ``Full Jurisdiction´´ Under the Civil Head of Article 6(1)

4.2.2.1.1.1.2 ``Full Jurisdiction´´ Under the ``Soft´´ Criminal Head of Article 6(1)

4.2.2.1.1.1.3 What Matters Is the Actual Exercise of ``Full Jurisdiction´´

4.2.2.1.1.2 Applied to Competition Law Remedies

4.2.2.1.2 The Current Practice of the EU Courts

4.2.2.1.2.1 General Remarks

4.2.2.1.2.1.1 Legality Review

4.2.2.1.2.1.2 Unlimited Jurisdiction

4.2.2.1.2.1.3 In Particular: The Commission´s Margin of Discretion Under the Standard of Legality Control

4.2.2.1.2.1.3 General Remarks

4.2.2.1.2.1.3 The Intensity of Limited Review in the Words of the EU Courts and Its Meaning

4.2.2.1.2.2 Applied to Remedies

4.2.2.1.2.2.1 Only Review of Legality

4.2.2.1.2.2.2 No Power to Reform a Remedy

4.2.2.1.2.2.3 Facts Posterior to the Adoption of the Decision Cannot Be Taken into Account

4.2.2.1.2.2.4 The Commission´s Margin of Discretion

4.2.2.1.2.2.4 A Particular Justification of Discretion: The Prospective Nature of Remedies

4.2.2.1.2.2.4 The Test Applied

4.2.2.2 Particularities Regarding the Review of Article 9 Decisions

4.2.3 Conclusion on Judicial Review

4.3 Conclusion on the Relaxation of Procedural Safeguards

Bibliography

Chapter 5: The Impact of Commitments on Legal Certainty

5.1 Disadvantages of Commitments in Terms of Legal Certainty

5.1.1 Lack of Clear Criteria When the Article 9 Procedure Applies

5.1.1.1 The Last Sentence of Recital 13 Regulation 1/03

5.1.1.2 Guidance Provided by the Best Practices and the Manual of Procedures

5.1.1.3 The Commission´s Practice and Its Criticism: Should the Scope of Application of the Article 9 Procedure Be Further Res...

5.1.1.4 Manifest Error in Choosing the Article 9 Procedure As a Ground for Judicial Review

5.1.2 No Right to a Commitment Decision?

5.1.2.1 Position of the Commission and the EU Courts

5.1.2.2 Doctrine

5.1.2.3 Comment

5.1.3 Remedies and the Commission´s Power to Prioritise Cases

5.1.3.1 Enlargement of the Commission´s Discretion

5.1.3.2 A Limit to the Commission´s Powers

5.1.3.3 Article 9 Does Not Increase the Commission´s Power to Prioritise Cases

5.1.4 Effects on Competition Authorities and Courts of the Member States

5.1.4.1 Effects on Power to Find an Infringement and Impose a Fine

5.1.4.1.1 Article 7 Decisions

5.1.4.1.2 Article 9 Decisions

5.1.4.1.3 De Facto Effects of Commission Decisions

5.1.4.2 Effects on Power to Adopt Further Injunctions or Commitments

5.1.4.3 Effects on Private Damages Actions

5.1.4.3.1 Article 7 Decisions

5.1.4.3.2 Article 9 Decisions

5.1.4.4 Can Decisions Be Enforced by National Courts or by National Competition Authorities?

5.1.4.4.1 Enforcement of Article 7 and Article 9 Decisions by National Courts

5.1.4.4.1.1 Preparatory Works of Regulation 1/03

5.1.4.4.1.2 Overview Over Opinions

5.1.4.4.1.3 Comment

5.1.4.4.1.3.1 Binding Nature of the Remedy

5.1.4.4.1.3.2 Enforcement in National Courts Contributes to the Effectiveness of EU Law (Effet Utile)

5.1.4.4.1.3.3 Unconditionality and Sufficient Precision

5.1.4.4.1.3.4 Creation of Rights in Favour of Third Parties

5.1.4.4.2 Enforcement of Article 7 and Article 9 Decisions by National Competition Authorities

5.1.4.4.2.1 Preparatory Works of Regulation 1/03

5.1.4.4.2.2 Overview Over Opinions

5.1.4.4.2.3 Comment

5.1.4.5 Intermediate Conclusion: Comparison of Article 7 and Article 9 Decisions and Comment

5.1.4.5.1 Uncertainty Regarding the Imposition of a Fine for Conduct That Predates the Commitment Decision

5.1.4.5.2 Reduced Facilitation of Follow on Action

5.1.5 Loss of the Positive Externalities of Adjudication

5.1.5.1 The Criticism

5.1.5.2 Comment

5.2 Advantage: Precise and Enforceable Obligations

5.2.1 The Problematic Precision of Injunctions Adopted on the Basis of Article 7

5.2.1.1 The EU Case Law

5.2.1.1.1 Cease and Desist Orders

5.2.1.1.1.1 Grundig and Consten

5.2.1.1.1.2 Aéroports de Paris

5.2.1.1.1.3 Microsoft II: Sufficient Precision of an Obligation to Grant Access on ``Reasonable Terms´´

5.2.1.1.1.3.1 The Case

5.2.1.1.1.3.2 Preliminary Comment

5.2.1.1.1.4 Excursus: Langnese

5.2.1.1.2 Abstract Like Effects Orders

5.2.1.1.2.1 Purely Declaratory Value

5.2.1.1.2.2 Restrictive Interpretation

5.2.1.2 The Stricter Standards Under German Law: Fährhafen Puttgarden

5.2.1.3 Discussion

5.2.1.3.1 Imprecise Orders to Put an Infringement to an End Do Not Produce Any Discrete Legal Effects

5.2.1.3.2 How to Assess Whether a Remedy Is Sufficiently Precise in Order to Serve As the Basis for the Imposition of Periodic...

5.2.1.3.2.1 Periodic Penalties Require a More Precise Basis Than Fines

5.2.1.3.2.2 The Freedom of Choice of the Concerned Undertakings Cannot Justify the Use of Imprecise Orders As the Basis for Pe...

5.2.1.3.3 Restrictive Interpretation or Annulment?

5.2.1.3.4 Concluding Example: Google Search

5.2.2 Precision in the Context of Article 9

5.3 Conclusion on the Impact of Commitments on Legal Certainty

Bibliography

Chapter 6: Outlook: Discussion of Reform Proposals

6.1 Reform Proposals Relating to Article 9 Decisions

6.1.1 Limiting the Scope of Application of Article 9

6.1.2 Access to the File

6.1.3 Participatory Rights of Complainants

6.1.4 Judicial Control

6.1.4.1 More Detailed Reasoning and More Comprehensive Analysis by the Commission

6.1.4.2 Subjection of Commitment Decisions to Prior Approval by the EU Courts

6.1.4.2.1 Judicial Control of Consent Decrees Under the US Tunney Act

6.1.4.2.2 A Model for the EU?

6.1.4.2.2.1 The US Standard of Review of Consent Decrees Is Not Stricter Than the EU Standard of Review of Commitment Decisions

6.1.4.2.2.2 The Introduction of a More Rigid Public Interest Control of Commitment Decisions in the EU Would Not Fit the Insti...

6.1.4.2.3 Exclusion of the Right of Complainants to Appeal Commitment Decisions

6.2 Reform Proposals Relating to Article 7 Decisions

6.2.1 Market Test

6.2.2 Increasing the Commission´s Flexibility?

6.2.3 Relationship Between Commitment Procedures and Fines

6.2.3.1 Extending the Settlement Procedure to Non-cartel Cases?

6.2.3.1.1 The Reasons for the Restriction of the Scope of Application of the Settlement Procedure

6.2.3.1.2 Different Objectives of the Commitment Procedure and the Settlement Procedure

6.2.3.1.3 No Significant Mitigation of the Disadvantages of the Commitment Procedure

6.2.3.1.4 No Necessity to Extend the Scope of the Settlement Procedure Given the Existence of Other Means to Combine an Infrin...

6.2.3.2 Revision of Fining Guidelines to Take Cooperation of Undertakings into Account?

6.2.3.3 Prohibition to Impose a Fine Subsequent to the Issuance of a Preliminary Assessment?

6.2.4 Reform of the Procedure Before the EU Courts

6.2.4.1 Increased Judicial Review of Infringement Decisions and Fines?

6.2.4.2 Speeding Up Court Procedures?

6.3 Miscellaneous

6.3.1 Increased Use of Informal Closure of Procedures?

6.3.2 Increased Use of Interim Measures?

6.3.3 Strengthening the Independence of the Administrative Decision Making Process?

6.3.4 Strengthening Private Enforcement?

6.4 Conclusion on Reform Proposals

Bibliography

Chapter 7: Summary of Key Findings